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Analysing whether and how the transition from the first to the second genera-
tion transforms adherence to Islam in Italy, a Catholic country which is undergoing 
a Lively  immigration and Muslim-welcoming debate, is extremely interesting. The 
growing presence of Muslims in Italy stresses relations with ‘diversity’, especially 
in those areas where the incidence of migrants coming from Maghreb is higher and 
where there is an Arabic presence visible through ethnic shops, women wearing the 
chador and men wearing long robes. In these areas, the issues of control and safety 
have been on the agenda for many years. On the other hand, according to Muslim 
organizations there is a common interest in presenting a ‘moderate Islam’. There is a 
specific will and interest of the youngest Muslim generations to demonstrate their 
propensity to promote integration, using both old (debates, meetings, etc.) and new 
(websites, blog, etc.) policy tools.
Keywords: immigration, religion, Italy, Islam, youth
1. Introduction
Assorted research [31, 48] has discredited the idea of the effectiveness of 
national models of integration and their unchangeableness at local level [10, 44, 
46], so that attention has shifted towards territorial scenarios where scholars are 
attempting to understand in depth the dynamics which spring up among natives, 
migrants and second generations. Literature on the great models into which vari-
ous ways of incorporating immigrants were subdivided (from assimilationism 
to multiculturalism, from Gastarbeiter to differentialism) puts us on our guard, 
however, against the illusion that national policies no longer play an important 
role in intervening on the insertion paths of non-autochthonous citizens [4]. At 
the same time, it warns us not to ignore (as sometimes happened in the past) 
the influence of the local context and everyday dynamics ‘triggered by diversity 
in the management of daily life’.1 The game of inclusion and social cohesion (of 
1 In this context management of immigration in Italy offers various examples of how national norms 
become declined differently at local level.
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which religion is an important theme) is really played out on the field of integra-
tion policies at local level, including relations with Muslims, old and young, first 
and second generations. Obviously, cities and neighbourhoods differ as to the 
composition of the immigrant population, its socio-demographic characteristics, 
initiatives and opportunities available to them, and also as to modalities of rela-
tions with the general citizenry and consequent social-cohesion processes [2]. In 
other words, they differ as to the so-called ‘local integration policies’ [9]. Among 
these strategies, there are those pertaining to the management of religious dif-
ference, which—albeit in a multi-religious environment2—Concerns only our 
relations between cities and the Muslim presence [11, 12]. Among immigrants, 
religiosity is alive, as is evidenced by the existence of mosques, churches and 
prayer halls. Of course, these are not only places of worship but are also welcom-
ing centres offering a kind of social-support system both for new arrivals and for 
irregular immigrants [37]. On the other hand, migrants feel at their ease in places 
of worship—there they find clergymen speaking their native language, sharing 
(or at least understanding) their cultural and ethnic background, aware of the 
difficulties of the meeting/clash between familiar ways of life and those expected 
by the host society.
If this is the situation for the first generation of immigrants, what happens with 
the second? Are they following the secularization process spreading among youth 
in Europe? Are they religious in the same way as their parents or are they embracing 
the European ‘lay’ way?
Research and studies have focussed on the growing presence of Muslims [7, 16, 33], 
through observations and insights carried out from different perspectives: religious 
beliefs and practices, hope for a certain type of society (secular versus Islamic), 
definition of identity (religious, Italian and cosmopolitan), orientation regarding the 
education of children and intermarriage and requests made to educational institutions 
(recognition of holidays and religious teaching in school). In addition, attention to the 
religious variable has often been correlated with that dedicated to labour issues (Are 
the Muslims discriminated against in the labour market, compared to other religious 
affiliations?), school (Does the increasing number of Muslim students give rise to 
claims against secularization and changes in education?), urban schedules and spaces, 
with specific requests regarding nutrition, places of worship and areas for the burial 
of the dead [36, 47, 49].
To some extent, the local dimension has been overlooked in that it means, on the 
one hand, that local policies intervene in managing Muslim communities’ daily lives 
and, on the other, that it is the arrival on the scene of the second generation that 
modifies (strengthening or weakening, modifying or erasing) their fathers’ and 
mothers’ recognition demands which had sometimes provoked a public reaction 
on the part of the citizenry. Here we shall try to view these two aspects through 
the experience of the city of Turin3 which—in virtue of its history of immigration, 
2 In Italy, Christians constitute 56% of immigrants, Muslims 32% and oriental religions 7%. In order to 
define how many Muslims (and also Orthodox, Hindus, Buddhists, etc.) there are among immigrants, the 
method used consists of projecting the religious beliefs of their countries of origin onto those immigrants. 
In practice, we suppose that the religious composition of foreign communities is similar to that in their 
countries of origin. We do not take into consideration how religious behaviour might change over the 
course of time or how religiousness during migration can change, growing weaker or stronger [29].
3 Turin has increasingly experienced four various migration waves with differing thrusts and motivations. 
The first wave started in the early 1970s and included students, mainly from the Middle East, Senegal 
and Nigeria, and political refugees and opposition members from South America (Chile and Argentina), 
Eritrea and Somalia. The second wave, also in the 1970s, was composed mainly of domestic workers: ini-
tially Somali and Eritrean women, then Filipino and Cape Verdean nationals. The third wave occurred in 
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the volume of its Muslim population and policies for managing immigration—
qualifies as a privileged observatory for seeing how the management of Islam takes 
place at local level.4 There are two elements which give pause for reflection. The 
first is that Turin is one of the few Italian contexts containing a mature Muslim 
community with children and adults, old and young, neo-Italians and converts 
[24, 34, 35]. Within the city’s Muslim universe, the Moroccan (first-arrived and 
most numerous) and Egyptian collectives are examples of ‘complete migratory 
cycles’ [13]. The second is that the (negative) effects of the economic crisis are 
reverberating on the social fabric, bringing back to the fore tensions and unresolved 
knots driving from intercultural as well as interreligious cohabitation, two elements 
which may affect dynamics between local policies and managing Islam.
2. Exploring the landscape of discussions on Muslims in the country
On the national level, it is easy to observe the problems and internal tensions 
of the various souls of Italian Islam and political deadlock when faced with an 
issue touching the exposed nerve of identity. On the local level, however, specific 
requests forwarded by Muslim communities are weighed and debated, becoming 
the object of policies and administrative interventions.
Comparison between the central level, which issues general guidelines, produces 
fact-finding documents and develops advisory bodies, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the local plane which intervenes, becomes part of the broad dialectic govern-
ing the integration process as a whole in Italy—of which religious integration is one 
of the thorniest issues. The local level is thus the privileged observatory from which 
to view how governing Islam is proceeding and whether/how it is modified in the 
passage from the first generation of immigrants to the second. It is at local level that 
one can analyse the specific recognition requests that Muslims address to public 
institutions in order to safeguard the culture they belong to and their life practices 
[50]. And it is at local level that young people start to become leaders of the life 
of mosques, make suggestions and measure themselves against the adults of their 
communities with regard to the management of Islam in a setting where they are a 
minority religion.
the period between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s: Turin witnessed a surge in the number of Moroccans 
and other Africans, Asians (Chinese and Filipinos) and Latin Americans (Peruvians). The last wave con-
cerned Eastern Europe: Albanians first, then Romanians and others. Some of the main characteristics of 
the current immigrant population are as follows: high rate of families with plans to remain; high rate of 
pupils from migratory backgrounds attending school and increasing participation in the labour market, 
both as employers and employees. With regard to religion, Islam represented the main religious affiliation 
among immigrants until 2003: since that year, the increasing arrivals from Eastern Europe have gradually 
changed the religious scenario. Even if Muslims now represent the second largest religious group among 
immigrants, they continue to attract the attention of the media and Italians in general.
4 These issues will be discussed using 40 interviews with young people involved in ethnic and/or religious 
activities and belonging to Islam living in various Italian cities, carried out in 2016, divided equally by sex. 
The analysis will also be enriched by considering stakeholders’ points of view and 5 Muslim associations’ 
representatives. Respondents were reassured about the confidentiality of information and the ethical 
uses of the collected interviews. In the interview quotations, they are recalled in the following way: sex 
(F = Female; M = Male), age and citizenship.
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There are three knotty problems in the debate:
1. Representation: As Ronchi reminds us, ‘The state and public authorities 
should be able to “relate to” one or more interlocutors who represent and 
reveal needs—primarily cultural—of their members’ [40]. In other words, it is 
essential to understand ‘who represents whom’. Grasping the real significance of 
religion-inspired associations, and their bond with the whole community of the 
faithful, is no trivial matter—especially locally, where negotiations take place in 
a climate of increasing competition among civil-society organizations for ever-
diminishing public resources. Numerousness, historical presence, diffusion 
throughout the socio-economic fabric of various contexts, active participation 
in cultural and charitable initiatives promoted by institutions and associations, 
all contribute to giving a hearing to Muslim demands, even in the absence of 
formal representation, to the extent that they are not Italian. This, however, is 
only one side of the coin. The other concerns informal means of representa-
tion, translated into encouraging organizational systems which are closer to 
the public: from neighbourhood round-table debates to gathering in the com-
munities’ meeting-places, from bringing together natives and immigrants to 
relations with ‘stakeholders’ [42]. It is not easy to identify these last. Are they 
to be found in places of worship? What kind of relations do they develop with 
ethnic-national associationism? And what is the role of other meeting-places, 
important for first generations, such as butchers’ shops, other shops and ethnic 
Premises? In this scenario, do cultural mediators play a privileged part because 
of their special position, often within institutions, relating to Italian operators 
and citizens while, at the same time, being capable of noticing the facets and 
cultural-identity implications of requests forwarded by Islamic communities?
These questions condition actors in the local context, influencing the attitudes 
of citizens and administration policies.
2. Freedom of religion: Guaranteeing the right to practise one’s own religion is an 
apparently simple matter, seeing that it is inscribed in Articles 8 and 19 of the 
Italian Constitution. In practice, the rhetoric of those opposing the presence 
of Muslims in Italy stresses two reasons why such freedom should be denied to 
followers of Allah. The first has to do with the lack of reciprocity: since it is not 
permitted to open non-Muslim places of worship in Islamic states, why should 
Muslims in Italy be granted such a right? The second concerns safeguarding 
public order, so that “as much religious freedom as is compatible with the needs 
of maintaining order and safety” [18] should be allowed. The debate is wide 
open and belongs to the realm of jurists.5 Here, it would be interesting to show 
the social implications of these considerations. Both form part of arguments 
that are used by citizens’ committees, political exponents and parties in reac-
tion to both free profession of faith and request made to practise their religion 
in public (it is sufficient to recall the polemic over granting spaces suitable for 
the feast of the end of Rhamadan). In these group’s perspectives, freedom of 
religion becomes entwined with the country’s Catholic identity—an identity 
which Muslims would call into question—so it should be limited and a public 
referendum held on the construction of places of worship [1, 26].
3. ‘Immigrant’ places of worship: it is proving hard to lose the label. The connec-
tion is clear for first generations, which bore it in mind while it influenced their 
recognition requests. For the second generations born and living in Italy, the 
5 In order to study this theme in more depth, see [5, 14, 20].
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matter becomes a paradox: although they are not migrants themselves, they are 
considered (and sometimes treated) as such. The Muslim-foreigner binomial 
leads public debate to specific topics (e.g., concession of cemetery spaces) of 
the wider immigration discussion: employment competition, welfare forecasts, 
socio-assistential guarantees. In other words, there is a cognitive postpone-
ment which revives the position of those who wish to defend strenuously Italy’s 
identity as monolithic and to be taken for granted once and for all and who, 
above all, consider Muslims as unwelcome guests who should be sent home 
[21]. These aspects, which in some cities concerned only certain neighbour-
hoods, have in other places become important to the political programmes 
of mayors and parties active at local level, uniting with the aforementioned 
themes of reciprocity and safety [43]. Quoting Mazzola again: ‘The mayor and 
city council could be negatively influenced by those who, on the ground, are 
not favourably disposed towards public manifestations of a religious nature, 
particularly those held by certain religious minorities’ [32]. This discourse 
recalls communes where islamophobic entrepreneurship-politics gave rise to 
ordinances hostile to the Muslim population [27, 41]. Specifically, attention 
focussed on places of prayer: indeed, the thermometer of irreconcilability 
between Italian society and Islam reaches its highest point, according to some, 
when it comes to discussing the building of a mosque. The mechanism of 
N.I.M.B.Y. reaction6 is again under the spotlight in Milan, where debate about 
building a mosque for EXPO2015 drew attention to the Islam-city relation-
ship [8]. This is nothing new for Lombardy’s capital city which, together with 
Piedmont’s (Turin), finds that a conspicuous part of the resident foreign 
population can be labelled (at least as far as country of origin goes) as Muslims. 
But compared with the 2011 debate and subsequent polemics, the clash in these 
first months of 2014 sees a passion on the part of the young generations—girls 
in particular—which has never been experienced before.
Are we witnessing a generational shift? A changing of the guard in the Islamic 
community, at least on a local level? Even if it too early to detect signs of what 
would be a Copernican revolution, there is no doubt that young children of immi-
gration bound to Islam are moving centre-stage [23]. It is one possible result in the 
context of processes triggered when the children of immigration grow up: from this 
point of view too, Italy is following a path already familiar to other European coun-
tries with a less recent immigration history [15]. Even if Frisina, in 2008, revealed 
a cautious, soflty-softly attitude, behind the lines, on the part of young Muslims 
towards putting forward their point of view, things no longer seem to be so: second 
generations’ visibility and self-promotion have grown. This evolution makes us 
aware of organizational skills and a widespread territorial presence, but above all it 
demonstrates the children of immigration’s need for—even religious—expression 
and identification [30].
3. Generational passage: new actors growing up
The generational passage can be noted from the relationship which young people 
develop with religious belonging even more than practices and dynamics in the 
6 “NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) conflicts have as their aim the public use of spaces considered undesir-
able by those who live there. Following a law-and-economic approach, giving it a ‘neutral’ interpretation, 
they can be described as potential imbalance between widespread benefits and concentrated costs for local 
populations, linked to the realisation of infrastructural  or social-type settlements” (see [38]).
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public arena [16, 25]. To synthesize and simplify, young interviewees can be divided 
into two groups.
First, there are those for whom religion is little more than education received in 
the family: Guolo would call them secularized young people who take part in some 
rituals, maintaining a collective Muslim identity in the face of relative indifference 
on the level of faith [28].
‘It is easy for boys and girls not to follow their parents’ teachings. Some who have 
come here—especially those who have married Italians—have forgotten Islam. 
Perhaps both parents work and the children go out and about with their friends, so 
they don’t even speak Arabic. Fortunately there are now antennas so that you can 
watch television from all over the world, which weren’t there before. This allows the 
children to know Arabic and religion better. In our days it all depended on us, but 
that was not enough. Now it’s easier, partly because there are more Muslim young 
people. We brought our children up to be like ourselves, but they have their own 
ways. They have more Italian than Egyptian friends. When they ask my permission 
to do something, I leave them to it because they know their religion so they know 
what they can and cannot do’. (M, 53, Egypt)
The interviewee has stressed an important element of the relationship between 
young people and religion: the force of numbers. An increasing visibility of Muslim 
families, of the number of schoolchildren declaring themselves to be Muslim, girls 
wearing the veil and associational activity linked to religion may therefore become 
fertile terrain for the sprouting of latent religious identities which the fear of stig-
matization or discrimination previously prevented from appearing. In this sense, 
prayer rooms in the city seem to carry less weight, although they remain a point of 
reference for the old pioneers and new arrivals alike, serving not only the typical 
purposes of religious organizations in emigration but also—and primarily—an 
identity rather than merely religious function [17].
For the second group, on the contrary, religion is a key element of identity, 
sometimes even in contrast with their parents’ generation which has developed a 
more private, less visible, religiosity.
‘My mother does not wear the veil. I decided to put it on after a trip to Egypt. Even 
though we were born in Italy, we cannot deny our roots. And religion is part of 
those roots. I am not afraid of saying that I come from a country rich in culture, 
important in Mediterranean history. I’m proud to be the daughter of Egyptians, 
proud to be Muslim. My mother has made a different choice. She has stopped strug-
gling. We know that life is not so easy for Muslims here in Italy. Today it is a little 
different: many of us now wear the veil at university, and nobody makes smart 
cracks or looks askance when we go round and about, to the cinema, shops and 
pizzerias. Twenty years ago it was different so, to cut a long story short, my mother 
stopped wearing the veil so as no longer to be always a target’. (F, 22, Egypt)
Compared with a few years ago, the girls – whose behaviour seems to be an 
interesting weathercock in the complex reality (including religious) of the children 
of immigration—are more visible. Their adherence is convinced, visible, proud 
and active: being Muslim is bound to associational involvement where the religious 
theme joins those of social cohesion, discrimination and citizenship.
Those who are involved with religious associations are aware of the distance 
separating their generation and their parents’ with regard to living and inter-
preting their faith as well as relations with Italy and their country of origin. 
Intergenerational comparison of religious aspects shows up a deep reflective 
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capacity on the part of the young, especially those with a higher level of education, 
in understanding the challenges facing them as children of immigration.
‘Your idea of a Muslim is someone who is always going to the mosque, who does 
only what the imam says, who observes Rhamadan. To me and many of my friends 
being Muslim means coming from a family which is attached to Islam. By now 
many of us young people only observe Rhamadan and take part in feast-days such 
as that of the Ram. We are Muslims in our own way. We live here, not in Morocco 
or Egypt, so we should try to adapt’. (M, 21, Morocco)
They also perceive the differences with regard to their parents’ education and 
socialization, which took place in environments permeated with religion where 
cultural, religious and national belongings were forged together into a unique 
affiliation—without distinctions within the local community, distinctive vis-à-vis 
interaction with the world outside.
In every migratory experience, at the generation shift, parents’ associationism 
faces up to that of the young, whom they would like at their side to give new energy 
to their activities—without, however, letting go of the reins of command or calling 
into question the associations’ philosophy or objectives. Is this true also for Muslim 
associationism?
An initial point of difference concerns the characteristics of the association-
ism. Among young people, it is a matter of a reflection and commitment path 
transversal to their origins: the criterion of access is that of recognizing Islam as 
their cultural-religious point of reference [22]. As one of them recalls: ‘We don’t ask 
our members for a certificate testifying that they are good Muslims. Our association is 
called ‘Young Muslims of Italy, so the access criteria are clear. We are not bound to any 
particular country: Italy is our common reference and that of our section is Turin’ (M, 
22, Morocco).
Another point of difference attains to leadership. Young people choose election-
type mechanisms whereas their parents relied on consensus: in one case, we find 
elections, directives, pre-established deadlines; in the other, reputation (as a good 
Muslim above all, but also endowed with elevated cultural and social capital) is the 
determining criterion in choosing.
A third element of difference has to do with the gender component: girls are an 
active part (although they have not yet reached the presidency), sometimes leading 
in organizing activities; mothers, on the other hand, keep a low profile.7 Here, we 
see not only a generational but also a gender revolution.
4. No longer recipients but protagonists: the active-citizens strategy
What positions, then, do young people belonging to Islam adopt when facing 
the demands cited above: do they stand alongside their parents or do they keep their 
distance by offering their own vision/interpretation of the questions under debate?
The mosque question may serve as a prism dividing the positions of first and 
second generations. As a young interviewee reminds us, the mosque represents—in 
a context of mature immigration, for backgrounds firmly settled—a request which 
may no longer be postponed:
7 There are obvious exceptions appear, above all in the world of ethnic-national associationism, whenever 
women become stakeholders.
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‘There is no religious life here. It doesn’t exist. If I am religious and want to prac-
tise, I can’t. Italian mosques are the ugliest places in the world… This is one of the 
main reasons why I want to go back to Egypt. Here I can’t practise the way I would 
like to: there are neither instruments nor structures… Relationship with religion is 
difficult here because you are in a different society. Islam is a religion for the whole 
world but if you have no mosque, you suffer because it’s hot and smelly with people 
shamefully packed together. If  they close the mosques it would  be extremely hard to 
practice one’s religion and develop one’s religious ideas’. (M, 26, Egypt)
Parents and children are in agreement about this demand, but with a different 
approach and attributing different meaning to it. For the latter, a mosque is now only 
a religious point of reference, and it should be considered as such in its structure and 
in its décor. For the men, above all, it is also for ‘recovering status’. Parents, seeing their 
authority under threat as their children rush into integration and social insertion, try ‘to 
recover status as members of the mosque and find the symbolic motivational strength 
to transfer it within the family’ [19]. This different approach implies a logical evolution 
from one generation to the next: all the younger interviewees reduce the mosque to a 
mere religious function, thereby creating clear discontinuity with the first generation.
How do they intervene in the local arena? How do they participate in the life of 
the city and promote associationism’s socio-cultural role?
For the parents’ generation, the cognitive framework within which this relation-
ship is set is that of immigration, which levers the dialectic between a community 
whose cultural-axiological roots are sunk deep in various elsewheres but are one as 
to religious reference and a hostile environment with which they are having trouble 
communicating. Their children would like to drop the references to immigration 
and diversity: the game is played among equals, between (almost) citizens, resi-
dents committed to the common good of the collective and the city. The change of 
tone is meaningful: as Scholten [45] and Borkert and Caponio [6] claim, the passage 
is from being destined to be the object of interventions to being fellow-actors in 
developing policies. In this sense, the intercultural variation, in the meaning (which 
we shall see in the following section) of ‘inclusive intercultural policies’, drives rela-
tions between Islamic associationism and local institutions to abandon the explo-
sive, reductive immigrants-versus-citizens dichotomy. What is more, for second 
generations it is no longer a matter of forwarding demands which limit Islam to 
a question regarding immigrants looking back nostalgically towards the past but 
of inserting the religious debate into the broader discourse of religious pluralism, 
unchaining it from its nexus with immigration. Energy is spent on constructing 
relations of partnership, on gaining credibility and recognition: in other words, on 
becoming trustworthy interlocutors of institutions and schools. Indeed, often the 
new actors have no experiences of migration, and are often Italian citizens, which is 
to say, young people of another religion trying to find space who express the desire 
to participate in their city’s intercultural and interreligious politics [39].
5. Who’s got the power? Something is changing at a local level
Turin was one of the first Italian municipalities to develop initiatives and proj-
ects to manage the increasing flows of migrants. In the last 30 years, the municipal-
ity has shifted from ‘action on demand’, generally multiculturally oriented, to a 
more coherent and specific intercultural policy.
This evolution has undergone four phases: the emergency policy (1980–1990); 
the creation of a network of specific services based on interaction between the 
municipality and the third sector (1990–1995), implementing an interesting 
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‘welfare mix’ model; the initial development of intercultural activities (1995–2005) 
and the development of intercultural policies (2006–2011).
In the first two periods, the policies can be defined as ‘multicultural’, i.e., aimed 
at helping and promoting the first insertion of the various migration flows with 
special attention to each ethnic background. The interventions supported in that 
period have been defined by the city administration as an ad hoc approach—that 
means that municipal initiatives were explicitly directed towards immigrants in 
specific difficult conditions, reacting to emerging social problems by mobilizing 
all the main local actors, public and private, interested in the issue (e.g., language 
courses, information offices, shelter centres, accommodation activities addressed 
especially to minors and women).
Attention to the second generations emerged mainly in the last period of the 
policy evolution, as will be described below. In fact, recently a new era seems to 
have come about: the consolidation of the intercultural discourse has taken place 
in tandem, generating a large number of practices, projects and experiences 
mainly based on the notions of dialogue, mutual exchange and social interaction 
[3]. The centrality of this policy was confirmed by the creation, for the first time, 
of a Department for Integration (2007), dedicated to defining a coherent inter-
cultural policy for promoting integration. Other municipal departments have 
to discuss and collaborate with this new department on each project, initiative 
and decision concerning integration issues. The goal is to insert the discourse on 
integration in all city policies, reinforcing the shift from special initiatives and ad 
hoc projects for migrants to policies capable of considering the various facets of 
the city’s residents.
This shift was part of the last two mayoral programmes (2006–2011; 2011–2015), 
where it was considered necessary to develop the intercultural dimension as an 
approach affecting all policy areas and to promote the involvement of immigrants in 
the city’s life in various fields: social, cultural and economic. Immigrants should be 
metamorphosed from being (or being perceived as) recipients to being pro-active 
participants promoting activities.
In this phase, attention to second generations and their civic involvement came 
to the fore. These young people are considered as the drivers of the integration 
process on both sides: on the one hand, supporting immigrants to be better inserted 
in the city and, on the other hand, helping Italian citizens in understanding the 
multiple aspects of immigration in the city. This new approach towards juvenile 
activism has been supported financially in the framework of two calls for projects 
that the municipality developed in agreement with a bank foundation. The initia-
tives admitted concern, mainly about second generations grown up in Turin to 
whom the city turns in order to develop its own intercultural policies. The activities 
carried out in order to train second generations to become active citizens may be 
divided into three groups according to their functions:
1. Initiatives directed towards useful or practical assistance: concrete help by 
offering services of orientation and counselling.
2. Gathering together emotional support activities, which may at times be 
defined as assistance towards self-expression and the formation of one’s own 
personality. In this sense, we should also recall improving youths’ communica-
tive and expressive capacities and the consequent development of relational 
skills in free time.
3. Activities directed towards information and educational support to offer 
moments of updating, reflection and education on subjects relevant to minors 
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and young people, to cope with educational challenges posed by adolescents, as 
well as to provide both young people and adults with useful information about 
educational and training paths.
The result of all these initiatives is the active involvement of young people as 
organizers, animators and educators of other foreign minors who are following 
insertion and growth paths in the city of Turin. Meantime, these activities strongly 
involve second generations in the city’s life by considering them active citizens of 
Turin, even if their citizenship is not Italian.
6. Conclusion: a new generation on the move
To sum up, a diachronic perspective allows us to reveal points of strength and 
weakness in the city’s relationship with first- and second-generation associationism. 
In the former case, the rapport was mainly on demand: associations, organization-
ally weak and ill-prepared to interact with administrations, belong to a prevalently 
‘by request’ dimension, whether for spaces or funds for small initiatives. With 
younger people, the relationship shifts towards partnership: better prepared both 
linguistically and about how administration mechanisms function, new generations 
aim to be recognized as reliable interlocutors. They make a point of being present 
and active in the city’s cultural events, and to intervene—whenever possible—in 
decision-making processes in order to reinforce their thesis that Islam is compatible 
with being active citizens. Even in an immigration laboratory city like Turin, their 
aspirations clash with reality because, no matter how much appreciated they are by 
the majority of political groupings, second-generation associations are not yet seen 
as being capable of replacing their parents associations as reference points for insti-
tutions. But we should be careful not to confuse absence from the decision-making 
process with absence from the debate inherent to questions of interest: children of 
immigration broadcast their view of how they define Muslim belonging by taking 
part in congresses, organizing public events and—above all—the Web.
The Turin experience seems to reveal a change of tone and capture the signals 
of a break between first- and second-generation associationism. Demands are more 
general, connected as they are with recognition as actors in, and an important part 
of, the city’s socio-cultural environment. Concerns are related to sensibilization 
and updating of the citizenry as to generational changes taking place in the Muslim 
community.8 One seems to be moving on the ground of ‘symbolic religiosity’, where 
second-generation religious identities are only tenuously connected with beliefs and 
practice, and are rather designed to strengthen common belonging to an associa-
tion. By means of symbolic religiosity, belonging to Islam can be translated into 
recognition of a common Muslim identity which is shared and practised within 
associational activities but is not necessarily tied to the observance of practices. 
There is thus a distancing between a practising Muslim and one who sees Islam as 
an identity and cultural marker. On the basis of this distinction, new demands and 
new relations (on the side of collaboration and sharing rather than that of break-
down and contrast) with local realities take shape. The objective is no longer simply 
recognition of one’s practices and specificity so much as that of one’s right to be 
different and the promotion of intercultural policies where religious diversity is but 
one element of the city’s social fabric and not a cause of conflict.
8 In this connection it is worth reading the theatrical work developed by a local section of Young Muslims 
of Italy: “Richiami Lontani” (Distant Echoes), aimed at introducing possible modalities of integration and 
intercultural dialogue to the Islamic public.
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What is at stake is the ability of second-generation Islamic associationism to 
move on from its condition of eternal youth and learn to conjoin the needs of the 
neo-Italians with those of the older generations. Once the time of falling back on 
their origins has passed, the future beckons. It is a future in which they are already 
on the threshold of becoming adults, adopting family responsibilities once again, 
and the appearance of an elderly generation which once more questions religious 
associationism and the city about needs which go well beyond caring for the soul.
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